How China tailors its messages on maritime disputes
New research uncovers why Beijing tells two different stories: one for its citizens, another for the world.
Published: (Updated: )
China鈥檚 territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas often dominate international headlines.
But a new study shows that China鈥檚 state media strategically crafts two distinct narratives鈥攐ne aimed at the domestic population and another designed for global audiences.
Mixed messages
鈥淐hina currently participates extensively in multilateral organizations and promotes an image of itself as a peaceful rising power. It does not want to appear threatening.
At the same time, theories suggest that the government must signal to its domestic audience that it will defend national sovereignty. This tension formed the gap we wanted to examine,鈥 says Esther Song, Associate Professor at Department of Government, University of Bergen.
Her research focuses on politics of China,authoritarian governance, and international affairs in the Asia-Pacific.
She explains that previous studies have shown that the government closely monitors domestic public sentiment. But not much research has examined whether Beijing also caters to international public opinion.
31,000 news articles
In her resent research article published in September 2024, Song has analyzed nearly 31,000 news articles published between 2002 and 2021 by major Chinese state鈥憆un outlets such as People鈥檚 Daily and China Daily.
Using text analysis, she examined how state media framed topics related to maritime disputes during two decades of rising geopolitical tensions. By comparing Chinese鈥憀anguage and English鈥憀anguage state media, the researcher documented a clear divergence in how state鈥憆un outlets describe these conflicts.
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Sovereignty above all
China can show determination by stirring up nationalism among its own citizens, but doing so may risk appearing threatening to neighbouring countries in the region. The research suggest that China manages this challenge by tailoring its messages depending on the audience.
The Chinese鈥憀anguage outlets consistently emphasized China鈥檚 legitimate and historically grounded claims to disputed territories. They invoked international law to validate China鈥檚 ownership, combined with strong assertions of national rights.
鈥淭hese narratives reinforce a confident, lawful stance, signaling to citizens that the government is unwavering in its commitment to territorial integrity,鈥 explains Song.
Peaceful intentions
English鈥憀anguage outlets, however, told a noticeably different story. While they also referenced international law, their tone was calming rather than assertive, emphasizing China鈥檚 desire to maintain peace. These articles aimed to counter claims from countries such as the U.S. and Japan that China is behaving aggressively.
This messaging appears designed to reassure global audiences that China is not a threat鈥攅ven as Beijing continues to defend its territorial claims.
Leaving the victim narratives
One of the most unexpected findings was what the researchers 诲颈诲苍鈥檛 see. Much literature on Chinese political communication highlights narratives of historical victimization鈥攑articularly regarding Japan and Western power鈥檚 occupation of Chinese territory in 19C and early 20C.
鈥淲e did not find much evidence of this in our dataset, even concerning Japan. We had expected stronger victimization narratives, but instead saw a more restrained, legality鈥 and history鈥慴ased approach. China appears to be speaking the language of legitimacy rather than grievance.鈥
Why it matters
The study sheds new light on how modern authoritarian states communicate strategically across different audiences.
It also challenges a common assumption in international relations research鈥攖hat domestic opinion is the only audience China cares about.
鈥淎s Chinas global presence growas, studying how the country frames its intentions do different audiences will only become more relevant. 鈥
Esther Song`s article 芦China麓s Dual Signaling in Maritime Disputes禄 (LENKE) , an annually award to commend the best paper published in the鈥疉ustralian Journal of International Affairs (AJIA).
This article has also been published in Science Norway: