2026 Bergen-Oslo Graduate Conference in Philosophy
This is the first graduate conference in philosophy organized in collaboration by the Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas at the University of Oslo (UiO) and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bergen (ºÚÁϳԹÏ×ÊÔ´). The purpose of the conference is to give PhD students in philosophy at ºÚÁϳԹÏ×ÊÔ´ and UiO an opportunity to present and receive feedback on their work, regardless of area and tradition, and to promote collaboration between the philosophical communities at ºÚÁϳԹÏ×ÊÔ´ and UiO.
Preliminary Programme
Thursday the 23rd of April 2026
09:00-09:15 Introduction
09:15-09:55 Alice Yijing Yang (Oslo): Between the Life and the Soul: Where Do the Nutritive Soul and the Life of Plants Stand?
10:00-10:40 Sverre Hertzberg (Oslo): Moral Vice, Ignorance and Moral Responsibility
10:40-10:55 Break
10:55-11:35 Audun Syltevik (Bergen): Why Ethical Theory Should Not Guide (as Much as It Could)
11:35-12:15 Peder Skjelbred (Oslo): Does Death’s Intrinsic Badness Ground the Critical Level?
12:15-13:30 Lunch
13:30-14:10 Sjur Sandvik Strøm (Oslo): From Radical Democrats to Sleeping Sovereigns? J.G. Fichte on Citizen Participation and Political Representation
14:15-14:55 Eirik Tangeraas Lygre (Oslo): Economists or Ecologists? Expertise, Democracy, and Interdisciplinary Climate Governance
14:55-15:10 Break
15:10-16:25 Keynote speaker: Hilary Greaves (Oxford): Consequentialist Explanation for Everyone
Friday the 24th of April 2026
09:00-09:15 Introduction
09:15-09:55 Julie Lauvsland (Oslo): The Value of Generative Definitions for the Foundations of Mathematics
10:00-10:40 Sofie Vaas (Oslo): A Countable Indeterminate Universe of Sets
10:40-10:55 Break
10:55-11:35 Alessandro Giglia (Oslo): On the Equivalence Between Potentialism and Actualism
11:35-12:15 Gioia Susanna (Oslo): Feferman on the Indeterminacy of the Continuum Hypothesis
12:15-13:30 Lunch
13:30-14:10 Ying Yao (Oslo): The Intrinsic Value of Attention
14:15-14:55 André Eilertsen (Bergen): Imprecise Epistemic Value in Epistemic Utility Theory for Categorical Belief